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Comments

Should an HMO's Physician Incentive Structure Give
Rise to Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under
ERISA?
INTRODUCTION

Managed health care presents one of the greatest challenges
facing America as we begin the 21st century. In the United States,
approximately 140 million people receive health care benefits
through plans from their employers or unions.' Sixty-nine million of
these employees were covered through plans regulated by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA). 2 This
paper will focus on one particular aspect of managed care that
presents a dilemma to patients and physicians alike - the ability
of a patient who has been harmed by the refusal of an HMO to
provide covered benefits to sue the HMO. In Part One of this
paper, I will provide a brief history of the difficulty patients
encounter when they attempt to sue their HMO's, focusing on the
impact of ERISA. Next, I will discuss how the courts have
responded to suits for breach of fiduciary duty against HMO's. In
addition, the article explores the various state and federal
legislative approaches taken to the problem. Finally, I conclude the
paper by agreeing with those courts calling for a legislative solution
to the problem.
1. HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUmAN SERVICES DiVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 4448 (GAO/
HEHS-Protecting 95-167 1995).
2.

Id.
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PART I
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA). 3 The express goal of ERISA was the
protection of employee pension plans through the regulation
mechanisms contained in the statute.4 In order to ensure that
ERISA, rather than state law, would be the definitive regulation
regarding employee pension plans, Congress inserted a broad
preemption clause in the statute.5 The preemption clause provides
in part, "Except as provided in subsection (b)... the provisions of
this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan . . . ."I The United States Supreme Court determined that
ERISA broadly preempted state law relating to employee health
plans.' In other words, in many instances ERISA, not state law, will
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-61 (1994).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) (stating that the goal of the legislation was to protect
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries); Donald T.
Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to
Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL L REV. 951 (2000) ("In passing ERISA, Congress intended to
reform the pension plan industry and provide comprehensive regulation of pension plans.").
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
6. § 1144(a). Section 1144 provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities. (B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003
of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003 (b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business
of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, tiust companies, or investment
companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). An Employee Benefit Plan is defined in ERISA as "an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(B)(3)
(1994). ERISA defines Employee Welfare Benefit Plan and Welfare Plan as:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
7. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (concluding that ERISA
comprehensively regulates welfare benefit plans thereby preempting state regulation); New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
650 (1995) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), "ERISA's comprehensive regulation of employee
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govern claims brought against employee health plans. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the preemptive effect of ERISA has lead to
an avalanche of litigation in federal and state courts.8
With respect to private health insurance, one of the most vexing
questions is whether a plan beneficiary may sue his Health
Maintenance Organization ("HMO") when the beneficiary is denied
benefits, or for the malpractice of its member physicians. The
answer is far from clear. The federal circuit courts of appeals are
split as to whether ERISA completely preempts all state law claims
against an HMO brought by a plan beneficiary; and if some state
actions are permitted by ERISA, under what circumstances may a
plan beneficiary bring an action against his HMO. 9
A. ERISA Preemption
Several circuits have held that an ERISA plan beneficiary may
not sue his HMO under any state law theory because ERISA
completely preempts any state causes of action for medical
malpractice against an HMO. 1° In Corcoran v. United Healthcare,"
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a person enrolled in an
HMO could not recover from the HMO in a state law wrongful
death action because the state law action was completely
preempted by ERISA. 12 The facts in Corcoran are relatively
common in these types of actions. The plaintiff was a pregnant
woman who had complications with past pregnancies. 13 Her doctor
recommended hospitalization to monitor the fetus twenty-four
hours a day.14 The defendant HMO, as part of its utilization review
procedure, determined that hospitalization was not necessary and
denied the request.' 5 Instead, the HMO decided that daily visits by a
home nurse would supply the proper amount of medical care to the
welfare and pension benefit plans extends to those that provide 'medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits' for plan participants or their beneficiaries....").
8. See De Buono v. NYSA-LA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 (1997)
(stating that since the Supreme Court initially decided the scope of ERISA preemption 16
years ago, it has decided 13 additional cases).
9. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TuL L REv. 951 (2000).
10. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat. Health Plan, 999 F2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Reily v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
856 (1988).
11. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
12. Id. at 1339.
13. Id. at 1323.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1324.
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plaintiff and her unborn fetus. 6 On a day when there was no nurse
on duty, the fetus went into distress and died. 7 Consequently, the
plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Louisiana state court
against the HMO."5
Using a common strategy, the defendant HMO removed the case
to federal court claiming that the state law causes of action were
completely preempted by ERISA, and subsequently moved for
summary judgment. 19 The trial judge granted the motion because he
found that the state law claims "related to the employee benefit
20
plan" at issue.
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit." The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's
decision, concluding that the HMO made a medical decision
concerning the plaintiffs need for hospitalization; however, it did
so in the process of making a determination of the benefits
available under the plan.22 As a result, the court held that ERISA

completely preempted the state law claimsY. Finally, the court held
that ERISA itself provides no remedy for the type of malpractice
claim advanced by the plaintiff. 24 Interestingly, the Corcoran court
16. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (1992).
17. Id. at 1324.
18. Id. at 1321. The Corcorans alleged that their unborn child died as a result of
various acts of negligence committed by Blue Cross and United. Id. The couple sought
damages for lost love, society and affection of their unborn child. Id. Mrs. Corcoran sought
damages for the aggravation of a pre-existing depressive condition and the loss of
consortium; Mr. Corcoran sought damages for loss of consortium. Id.
19. Id. In moving for summary judgment, the defendants argued that in essence the
plaintiffs complaint sought damages for improper claim administration. Id.
20. Id. at 1326. In granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the district court
determined that the state law claim brought by the plaintiffs was related to the employee
benefit plan. The district court also noted that Mrs. Corcoran could have brought a
declaratory judgment action against the defendants under ERISA seeking hospitalization
benefits, or in the alternative, she could have paid for her own hospitalization and
subsequently brought suit under ERISA to recover these expenses. Id.
21. Corcoran, 965 F.2d 1321, 1326
22. Id. at 1331.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1339. The plaintiff attempted to argue that if ERISA did preempt their state
law causes of action, the plaintiff could recover under the civil enforcement provision of
ERISA. Id. The civil enforcement provision states in pertinent part:
A civil action may be brought ... (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (a) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan

[.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994). The plaintiff argued that section (B) would apply in this case.
Corcoran, 965 F2d at 1338. The court held that emotional distress and mental anguish
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noted that "the result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have
been a serious mistake."25 The end result in this case, and others
like it, compel the conclusion that people injured through cost
containment procedures like utilization review, administered by an
HMO governed by ERISA, will have no remedy at law in
jurisdictions that support a broad interpretation of ERISA's
preemption clause.
B. Cracking ERISA Preemption
In response to the Corcoran decision, several federal circuit
courts of appeals have taken the opposite approach with respect to
interpreting ERISA to preempt traditional state law malpractice
claims. Recently, in Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare,the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted the preemption clause of ERISA to
permit state law claims that were "directed at the quality of
benefits provided."26 The facts in Bauman are again typical in cases
involving malpractice claims against an HMO charged with
administering an ERISA benefit plan. In accordance with the HMO's
policy, Mrs. Bauman was discharged, along with her daughter, from
the hospital twenty-four hours after giving birth. 27 The next day the
Baumans noticed that the child was 11.28 In order to make a
diagnosis and treatment, the Baumans made several telephone calls
to their doctor who did not advise them to bring their daughter
back to the hospital. 29 The Baumans also contacted the defendant,
requesting an in-home visit by a pediatric nurse; however, a nurse
was not provided.3 0 Later that day, the infant died from an
undiagnosed Group B strep infection that had developed into
meningitis.

31

Subsequently, within a month the Baumans filed an action
against U.S. Healthcare in New Jersey state court alleging several
state causes of action. 32 In response, the defendant removed the
damages were not recoverable under section (a)(3)(B). Id.
25. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
26. Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162 (3d. Cir. 1999), pet. for cert. filed,
68 ULSW 3552 (2000). See also Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Lupo V.
Human Affairs Int'l Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d. Cir. 1994).
27. Bauman, 193 F3d at 155.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bauman, 193 F3d at 156. In their first count, the plaintiffs alleged that the HMO
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case to the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey on
the ground that ERISA preempted the state action filed by the
3 The Bauman's
Bauman's.A
motioned the district court to remand
the case to state court.3 While the district judge was considering
the motions, the defendant moved to dismiss all claims against it
because it believed that ERISA completely preempted them. 35 The
district judge dismissed one count, and remanded three counts to
the state court; the defendant appealed.36
In affirming the lower court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
relying on an earlier case, drew a distinction between state law
claims directed to the quality of benefits provided and claims
directed to the quantity of benefits provided.3 7 The court noted that
often an HMO acts in a dual capacity: one, as administrator of the
plan; and two, as a health care provider. When acting as an
administrator, the HMO determines eligibility for benefits,
calculates benefits, disburses benefits to participants, keeps
records, and monitors available funds.3 State law claims directed
to these types of subjects are completely preempted by ERISA;
conversely, the HMO acts as a health care provider when it
provides or arranges for medical treatment. 39 As a result, the court
held that the plaintiff's state law claims were directed at the HMO
as a medical provider because the twenty-four hour discharge
policy (hospital precertification) "encouraged, pressured, and/or directly" required the 24
hour pre-certified discharge used by the doctor and hospital. Id. The next count alleged that
U.S Healthcare acted in reckless disregard for the well being of its members when it
implemented its 24 hour discharge policy because it knew that newborns were at risk for
developing diseases and the policy would delay treatment. Id.
33. Id. at 157.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Bauman, 193 F3d at 161-62. The court relied on Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57
F3d 350 (3d. Cir. 1995), where plaintiffs in a consolidated action alleged negligence on the
part of the defendant HMO for selection of medical personnel providing care to the plaintiffs.
The court held that the plaintiffs were attacking the quality of the care received, not that
benefits under the plan were "erroneously withheld." Id. Indeed, the Court of Appeals
concluded that:
Perhaps the most significant contribution made by the Dukes opinion was the
distinction drawn between (1) state-law claims directed to the quality of benefits
provided, which are not completely preempted, and (2) claims that the plans
erroneously withheld benefits due or that seek to enforce plaintiffs' rights under their
respective plans or to clarify their rights to future benefits, which are subject to
complete preemption.
Id. at 161-62.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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policy was a medical determination about the proper standard of
care that resulted in the death of the infant, not a claim that a
benefit was requested and denied. 40 Bauman seems to stand for the
proposition that an HMO will not be able to completely shield itself
from liability, via ERISA, for traditional medical malpractice
claims. 41 Further, it appears that if plaintiffs do not allege in their
pleadings that the HMO failed to provide or authorize benefits, the
court will likely conclude that ERISA preempts the state law
42
claims.
When one compares the approach to the ERISA preemption
problem taken by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and that taken
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the approach of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals appears better reasoned. This is so
because ERISA is simply devoid of any substantive regulation of
health care. The Act is replete with complicated provisions laying
out in painstaking detail various requirements pertaining to
employee pension plans. This would indicate that Congress never
intended ERISA to have the effect of barring, in effect, state law
medical malpractice claims against health insurers.
In sum, recovery under a state law theory of medical malpractice
against an HMO will depend largely on what jurisdiction the
40. Bauman, 193 F3d at 163. The court found that as to count one, the plaintiffs pled
facts which place it within the quality of care context rather than the quantity of care
because the plaintiffs alleged that the hospital's early discharge policy had the effect of not
giving the plaintiffs the option of making an informed decision as to whether to pay for the
hospitalization out of pocket. Id. As to count two of the complaint, the court found that the
allegation that the defendant knew that its policy would endanger. the lives of children after
they left the hospital was sufficient to fall within the quality of benefit context. Id. Finally,
the plaintiffs contended that "the HMO adopted policies that encouraged pressured, and/or
directly or indirectly required their participating physicians to discharge newborn infants and
that also discouraged physicians to readrit newborn infants when the appropriate standard
of care required otherwise under state law." Id. The court concluded that based on these
allegations the plaintiffs' theory was within the realm of quality of care provided because it
was aimed at a discretionary medical decision rather than an administrative one. Id.
41. For a recent case, decided December 26, 2000, interpreting ERISA preemption in
the Third Circuit, see Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 2000 WL 1886619 (3d Cir. 2000). In
Lazorko, the plaintiff alleged that an HMO's disincentive structure discouraged his wife's
doctor from providing her with additional treatment for various mental illnesses. Id. As a
result, the plaintiff's wife committed suicide. The plaintiff asserted that the HMO was directly
and vicariously liable for his wife's death. Id. The district court held that ERISA did not
preempt the plaintiffs vicarious liability claims, but ERISA did preempt any direct claims
against the HMO since those claims were in the nature of a denial of benefits guaranteed by
the plan. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the direct claims
"challenge the soundness of a medical decision by a health care provider rather than the
administration of benefits under an ERISA plan." Id.
42. See id. at 162. (stating that "It is significant that none of these three counts as pled
alleges a failure to provide or authorize benefits under the plan .... ").
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plaintiff is in. Further, since the federal courts are fairly uniform in
concluding that extra-contractual damages are not available under
the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, injured parties in those
circuits that have adopted a broad view of the preemption clause
will be left without a remedy for serious injuries. Consequently,
HMO's in jurisdictions that favor broad preemption will be able to
use ERISA as a shield of 'immunity against claims for medical
malpractice, thus providing an incentive to place a higher premium
on cost containment than patient care. As a result, the two primary
goals of Congress in enacting ERISA, protection of plan
beneficiaries and uniformity of law, will not be met. Part II of this
paper will explore how several federal circuit courts of appeals
have responded to this apparent dichotomy by upholding actions
against HMO's for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
PART II. ACTIONS UNDER ERISA
Perhaps in response to the inequity involved in cases like
Corcoran, in 1997 in Shea v. Esensten43 , the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an HMO could be liable for breach of a fiduciary
duty under ERISA for failing to disclose financial incentives. In
Shea, the plaintiff was the widow of a deceased plan participant of
an HMO that administered an ERISA health plan." The plaintiffs
husband went to his primary care physician complaining of chest
pains, difficulty breathing and dizziness. 45 The physician refused to
refer Mr. Shea to a cardiologist, even after Mr. Shea offered to pay
for the specialist himself.46 Apparently discounting Mr. Sheas'
extensive family history of heart disease, his physician told him
that, first, he was too young for a referral, and, second, he "did not
47
have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a cardiologist."
Mr. Shea did not know that his HMO, by the terms of its contract
with his primary care physician, gave financial incentives to
48
primary care physicians for not making referrals to specialists.
Furthermore, the contract also provided that the primary care
physician would be penalized financially if he made too many
referrals to specialists. 49 Several months later Mr. Shea died of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Shea v. Esensten, 107 F3d 625 (8th. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997).
Id. at 626
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shea, 107 F3d at 627.
Id.
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massive heart failure. 5° Mr. Shea's widow filed a wrongful death
claim against the HMO in state court.51 The HMO removed the case
to federal court; Mrs. Shea filed an amended complaint alleging
that the HMO violated its fiduciary duty under ERISA by
implementing the secret financial incentive structure.5 2 The trial
4
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.5
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,
holding that "when an HMO's financial incentives discourage a
treating doctor from providing essential health care referrals for
conditions covered under the plan benefit structure, the incentives
must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of ERISA's
fiduciary duties." 4 In reaching its holding, the court noted that
ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to act solely in the interests of plan
beneficiaries. In addition, Judge Fagg, writing for the majority,
opined that ERISA fiduciaries owe beneficiaries the common law
duty of loyalty which requires a fiduciary "to communicate any
material facts which could adversely affect a plan member's
interest."56 The court continued and noted that the salient
50. Id. at 626.
51. Id. at 627.
52. Id.
53. Shea, 107 E3d at 627. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand the action to state
court, which was denied by the district court. She then filed an amended complaint where
she alleged that the HMO's "behind the scenes efforts" to reduce covered referrals violated
the HMO's fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. The district court held that the financial
incentive scheme involved was not a "material fact affecting a beneficiary's interests";
therefore, the court dismissed the action on a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion by the
defendant. Id.
54. Id. at 629. It should be noted here that the court of appeals agreed with the district
court that ERISA completely preempted the plaintiffs state law cause of action. The court of
appeals held that the plaintiff's tort claims against the HMO were completely preempted
because ERISA supercedes state law insofar as it "relates to any employee benefit plan." Id.
at 627 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). The court observed, "to this end, the language of
ERISA:s preemption clause sweeps broadly, embracing common law causes of action if they
have a connection with or a reference to an ERISA plan." Id. The fiduciary duties are
prescribed by section 1104 of ERISA that provides in pertinent part
Subject to sections . . . a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive
purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence ... that a prudent man ... would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of alike character and with like aims ....
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(b) (1994).
55. Id. at 628 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994)).
56. Id. In characterizing ERISs fiduciary standard, the court relied on an earlier case,
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996), for the proposition that ERISA fiduciaries must
comply with the common law duty of loyalty, which includes fair dealing and honesty with
respect to plan members. Id. The court also relied on precedent from the D.C. Circuit Court
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incentives involved were material because the patient relied on his
doctor's advice, and in order for the patient to make an informed
decision he would have to know if his doctor's advice was affected
by other forces. 57 The court did not discuss the type of damages
recoverable by Mrs. Shea.58 This case indicates a willingness on the
part of some federal courts, seemingly frustrated with ERISA
preemption relating to medical malpractice claims, to entertain
suits against HMO's under ERISA itself.
However, the Shea decision has not been met with widespread
acceptance. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
rejected the Shea court's holding in Ehlman v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of Texas.59 In Ehlmann, the court held that ERISA did
not impose a duty on HMO's to disclose their physician incentive
plans because the text of the statute does not specifically impose
the disclosure of physician compensation schemes. 60 The court
reasoned that since the statute contained numerous other
disclosure provisions, the failure to place physician incentives
among these illustrates that Congress could not have intended
ERISA to require an HMO to disclose its physician compensation
plans. 61 Furthermore, the court criticized the Shea court's reasoning
because it failed to engage in a statutory analysis to ascertain the
intent of Congress with respect to fiduciary reporting
62
requirements.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to
expand the possible range of liability against an HMO for breach of
of Appeals. In Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
the court held that "the duty to disclose material information is the core of a fiduciary's
responsibility, animating the common law of trusts long before the enactment of ERISA."
57. Shea, 107 F3d at 628-29. The language of the court was particularly strong as Judge
Fagg concluded that "this kind of patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about
treatment options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self
serving financial considerations created by the health insurance provider." Id.
58. Id. at 629.
59. 198 F3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000).
60. Id. at 555. The court reasoned that ERISA makes specific provisions for HMO's to
disclose various items; therefore, because physician compensation schemes are not
mentioned in them, Congress did not intend to impose that particular duty on HMO's. Id. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1994).
61. Id. The court concluded that "it is for Congress to determine whether to impose
such a duty to disclose under ERISA and this court will not encroach on that authority by
imposing a duty which Congress has not chosen to impose." Id.
62. Id. at 556. In construing ERISA, the court reasoned that because ERISA included
numerous reporting requirements, the fact that an incentive disclosure structure of the type
at issue was not included indicates that Congress never intended ERISA to impose such a
duty.
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a fiduciary duty in Herdrich v. Pegram.6 The court held that plan
administrators breach a fiduciary duty under ERISA when the
incentive structure created destroys the fiduciary trust between
plan participants and plan fiduciaries by causing doctors to
withhold care that would decrease the doctors' profits.6 The
Herdrich case involved the same basic fact situation as the cases
discussed to this point. In essence, the plaintiff was forced to wait
eight days before undergoing a medical examination, so that she
could be cared for at the HMO's hospital, even though an
ultra-sound examination was certainly necessary after her doctor
discovered a large mass in her lower stomach.6 The mass was the
plaintiff's inflamed appendix, which subsequently ruptured during
the eight day wait for tests causing a dangerous condition known
as peritonitis.6 The plaintiff survived, and shortly thereafter
brought suit against her doctor for negligence and against the HMO
6
under an Illinois consumer fraud statute.
This is where the instant case departs from the prior cases
discussed herein because the doctors who owned the practice
where the plaintiff's doctor saw her were the same people who
oversaw the HMO that the plaintiff belonged to. 68 Therefore, the
physicians were in total control of the incentive structure created
by the HMO. 69 Indeed, the incentive was a year-end bonus paid to
the physicians if the annual expenditures of the plan were less than
total plan receipts. 70 Therefore, the plaintiff's doctors could realize
a direct financial benefit if they were able to limit referrals and the
use of "out of plan" facilities by members of the plan. 71 In other
words, the plaintiff's health care providers assumed a dual role:
first, as a health care provider, and, second, as an HMO
administrator.
Predictably, the defendant HMO removed the case to federal
court arguing that the state law fraud claims against it were
preempted by ERISA. 72 The trial court gave leave to the plaintiff to
63. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999),
and rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
64. Id. at 373.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 365-66.
68. Herdrich, 154 E3d at 370.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 372.
71. Id. at 373.
72. Id. at 366.
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amend her compliant as to the state fraud counts. 73 In response,
the trial court granted the HMO's motion to dismiss the claim on
the ground that the amended complaint failed to state a claim for
which relief could be granted. 4 The plaintiff appealed the dismissal
75
of the ERISA claim to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals noted that in order for a plaintiff to state a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the plaintiff must
show that the defendants are plan fiduciaries who breached their
fiduciary duties causing a loss. 76 Judge Coffey, writing for the
majority, began by addressing whether the defendants were plan
fiduciaries under ERISA. 7 The key in determining fiduciary status
is the amount of discretionary control and authority retained by the
fiduciary. 78 In the instant case, the defendants had the exclusive
right to decide all claims; therefore, it was difficult for the
defendants to deny that they were not plan fiduciaries. 79 Further,
the majority observed that the defendants, in removing the case to
federal court, claimed that they were fiduciaries under ERISA;
however, on appeal the defendants claimed that they were not
fiduciaries under ERISA.8° Judge Coffey concluded that the
81
defendants were, in fact, fiduciaries under ERISA.
In the instant case, the court correctly concluded that the
defendants clearly breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff
because the defendants acted in their own pecuniary interests
rather than in the interests of plan beneficiaries. Section 1104 of
ERISA sets the standard of care a fiduciary must maintain.82
Federal courts have consistently held that this section imposes on
the fiduciary the duty to act solely in the interests of plan
73. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 367.
74. FED. R. Cw. P. 12(b)(6) (1999).
75. Herdrich, 154 E3d at 367.
76. Id. at 369.
77. Id. ERISA provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets... or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
78. Herdrich, 154 E3d at 370.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 369 n.5.
81. Id. at 371.
82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries.a It would be difficult to imagine that by withholding
benefits under the plan in order to increase their bonuses, the
physicians were acting solely in the interests of plan participants.
As a result, actions of this nature necessarily breach the fiduciary
duty that ERISA imposes. To make out an effective claim, however,
a plaintiff must also allege that the plan incurred a loss.
ERISA permits a plaintiff to bring a claim for losses to a plan,
itself, as a result of the breach of a fiduciary duty.8 Section 1109 of
ERISA provides that a fiduciary is personally liable for losses to the
plan due to the fiduciary's breach.8 5 In the instant case, Judge
Coffey held that the plaintiff did allege that the plan suffered a loss
(assets paid to the physicians for bonuses) due to the defendant's
breach.86 As a result, the plan was deprived of supplemental
medical expenses that were paid to the physicians which could
have been invested by the plan. In sum, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals made a valiant effort to attach liability under ERISA to
an HMO for breach of fiduciary duty. The defendant appealed the
87
Seventh Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court.
On February 23, 2000, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in Herdrih.8 The theory espoused by the defendants aptly
illustrates why these malpractice claims belong in state court and,
consequently, why ERISA's preemption analysis should be
interpreted under the Bauman standard. Interestingly, the thrust of
the HMO's oral argument was that it was not a plan fiduciary.8
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that in removing the case from state
court the defendants argued that they were plan fiduciaries, thus
providing the grounds for preempting the plaintiff's state law claims
under ERISA 0 Counsel for the defendant argued that the
defendant conceded it was an ERISA fiduciary only for the purpose
83. See Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Ser. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991-92 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding defendants breached fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to disclose material
information concerning reimbursement under a pension plan).
84. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d
651, 657 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994) (stating in part, "Any person who is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed
upon fiduciaries ... shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan resulting from each such breach ...
86. Herdrich, 154 F3d at 380.

.

87. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999).
88. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Pegram v. Herdrich, 2000 WL
213101 (2000) (No. 98-1949) (U.S. Oral Arg.).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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of removing the case to federal court, not for the purposes of the
merits of the plaintiff's amended complaint.9 ' In other words, the
HMO should be able to have its cake and eat it.
On June 12, 2000, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Herdrich9 2 Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court, holding that the treatment decisions made by an HMO acting
through its physician employees were not fiduciary acts within the
meaning of ERISA.9 3 Specifically, the Court held that mixed
questions of eligibility and treatment by HMO doctors are not
fiduciary duties under ERISA. Therefore, the defendant could not
have breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA.
In reaching its holding, the Court noted that Congress did not
intend an HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it
makes mixed eligibility decisions. 95 However, the Court did not
reach this conclusion by relying on the legislative history of ERISA.
Rather, the Court concentrated on the public policy implications of
holding that a mixed eligibility/determination falls within the ambit
of a fiduciary act under ERISA.96 Justice Souter pointed out that
91. Id.
92. Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
93. Pegram 120 S. Ct. at 2146. Justice Souter began his opinion with a plea to Congress
to take action. Specifically, he observed:
But whatever the HMO, there must be rationing and inducement to ration. Since
inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and rationing
necessarily raises some risks while reducing other... any legal principle purporting
to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would embody, in effect, a judgment
about socially acceptable medical risk. A valid conclusion of this sort would, however,
necessarily turn on facts to which courts would probably not have ready access:
correlations between malpractice rates and various RMO models, similar correlation
involving fee-for-service models, and so on. And, of course, assuming such material
could be obtained by courts in litigation like this, any standard defining the
unacceptably risky HMO structure . . . would depend on a judgment about the
appropriate level of expenditure for health care in light of the associated malpractice
risk. But such complicated fact-finding and such a debatable social judgment are not
wisely required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the
legislative process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and
judgments of social value, such as optimum treatment levels and health care
expenditure. The very difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress' superior
institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial
solutions are preferable.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 2158.
95. Id. at 2156. Mixed eligibility decisions refer to decisions made regarding treatment
and eligibility for benefits. Id.
96. See id. at 2156 (stating that "our doubt that Congress intended the category of
fiduciary administrative functions to encompass the mixed determinations at issue here
hardens into conviction when we consider the consequences that would follow from
Herdrich's contrary view.").
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taken to its logical end, liability for breach of fiduciary duty would
attach whenever an HMO had a profit incentive to ration care that
affected mixed decisions. 97 As a result, according to the Court, if
the lower court's decision was allowed to stand, it would prompt
an upheaval in the HMO system in the United States by effectively
putting HMO's out of businessf 8 This result would be contrary to
the congressional policy of promoting HMO's. 9
It seems inconceivable that the defendant could argue that it is
an ERISA fiduciary for purposes of defeating the plaintiff's state
law claim, but, once in federal court, argue that it cannot be liable
for breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA because it is not a
fiduciary. This argument illustrates how ERISA, as applied to
HMO's in malpractice cases, has evolved into nothing short of a
broad shield of tort immunity that is used for purposes of defeating
otherwise viable state law claims. When this is coupled with
ERISA's almost complete lack of health care regulation, only one
conclusion can be drawn. A scheme has evolved that is teeming
with inequity and cries out for action by Congress. 1°°
Judicial expansion of liability under ERISA for breach of
fiduciary duty would be tenuous at best due to the nature of the
recovery permitted. As discussed above, the fiduciary would not be
liable to any one specific beneficiary for damages resulting from
the breach. This failure of ERISA to provide damages to an
aggrieved party is an inherent weakness in breach of fiduciary duty
claims under ERISA and stands in stark contrast against traditional
state law negligence or fraud claims that provide for
extracontractual damages. Because a beneficiary who has been
personally injured may not recover personally, he or she will be
deprived of compensation for any damages that were sustained.
In contrast, however, the claim for breach of fiduciary duty could
be a useful tool in deterring substandard medical decision-making.
Because fiduciaries would be personally liable for losses to the
plan, they would presumably have an increased incentive to make
reasonable medical decisions thereby avoiding the tragedies
discussed earlier in this article. Additionally, breach of fiduciary
duty claims would provide nationwide uniformity among claims
97. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2156.
98. Id. at 2156-58
99. Id. at 2156-57.
100. See Goodrich v. Aetna, 1999 WL 181418 (awarding over 120 million dollars against
an HMO for failing to provide cancer treatment to plaintiff; allowed because the plan
(government sponsored) did not fall within the scope of ERISA).
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against HMO's for negligence. However, it is difficult to reconcile
these two types of claims because negligence law and the law of
fiduciary duty via trusts are two distinct substantive bodies of law.
Therefore, it would be difficult to convert what is in essence a
negligence claim to a breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA.
PART III

A.

The CongressionalResponse or Lack Thereof

None of this has escaped the attention of Congress where several
bills have been introduced over the last two sessions that in one
guise or another seek to amend ERISA to permit suits against
HMO's. Senator Durbin introduced the most cogent bill, S.1136, in
the Senate in 1997.101 The finding and purpose section of the bill
stated that patients have been left without a remedy for medical
malpractice in jurisdictions that have adopted a broad view of
ERISA preemption. 1 2 Furthermore, the findings section also states
that physicians' behavior is affected by employer-sponsored health
insurers' coverage determinations. 0 3 Therefore, the Senator
concluded that in order to restore accountability to HMOs, ERISA
must be amended.104 Specifically, S.1136 would simply add a
paragraph to section 1144(b) of ERISA with language expressly
permitting a state cause of action for medical malpractice, personal
injury, or wrongful death against any entity that provides health
insurance.'0 5 Unfortunately, S.1136 died in the Labor and Human
Resources Committee in 1997. However, there is no shortage of
proposed legislation in both houses of Congress. Each political
party had its own version of bills that would amend ERISA as part
of comprehensive "Patients' Bills of Rights."106 However, neither bill
101. S.1136, 105th Cong. (1997).
102. Id. § 2.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 3.
105. S.1136, 105th Cong. § 3(a) (1997).
106. See Patients Bill of Rights Act, S.3058.2990, 106th Cong. (2000). S.3058 was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Kennedy and proposes to amend section 1144 of ERISA
by adding the following subsection:
(f) PREEMPTION NOT TO APPLY TO CERTAIN ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF
PROVISION OF HEALTH BENEFITS-(1) NON-PREEMPTION OF CERTAIN CAUSES
OF ACTION-(A) IN GENERAL-Except as provided in this subsection, nothing in this
title shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any cause of action by a
participant or beneficiary . . . under State law to recover damages resulting from
personal injury or for wrongful death against any person-(i) in connection with the
provision of insurance, administrative services, or medical services by such person to
or for a group health plan as defined in section 733, or (ii) that arises out of the
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survived the 106th Congress. This result is interesting in light of the
fact that a recent poll indicates that 77% of Americans said that
"they support changing federal law to allow patients to sue HMOs
when they are injured by negligent decisions or cost containment
10 7
actions.
B. The State Response
While any meaningful federal legislation addressing the ERISA
problem was mired in Congress, several states took action and
passed comprehensive patients' bills of rights. The Texas
legislature, to its credit, took the lead and passed the nation's first
patient bill of rights. President, then Governor, Bush signed the bill
into law in 1997. The Texas Health Care Liability Act provides a
direct cause of action against an HMO for negligent health care
treatment decisions and for the negligence of its member
physicians.108 The statute carefully avoids ERISA preemption
arrangement by such person of the provision of such insurance, administrative
services, or medical services by other persons.
Id.
The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S.1344, 106th Cong. S.1344 was introduced in
the Senate by Senator Lott. Senator Lott's bill does not provide for amending ERISA to
permit state law causes of action, but rather proposes a stringent regulatory scheme that
provides for grievances and appeals of adverse coverage decisions made by HMO's. Senator
Lott's amendment provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 503. CLAIMS PROCEDURE, COVERAGE DETERMINATION, GRIEVANCES AND
APPEALS. (a) CLAIMS PROCEDURE-In accordance with regulations of the Secretary,
every employee benefit plan shall-(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any
participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied,
setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant; and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any
participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
Id.
These two provisions illustrate the divergence of opinion within the legislature with
respect to the approach to be taken in holding HMO's accountable for decisions that are
made in the course of making coverage determinations.
107. Corrine P. Parver & Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Liable:
Assessing Liability Under a Managed Health Care System, 51 ADMIN. L REV. 199, 236 n.221
(1999).
108. TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 2000). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
(a) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed
care entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making
health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care. (b) A health
insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care entity for a
health care plan is also liable for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee
proximately caused by the health care treatment decisions made by its: (1) employees;
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problems because it does not seek to apply the negligence standard
to treatments not covered by the plan. For example, an HMO
would not be held to the standard of ordinary care for a decision
not to provide a certain type of treatment within the scope of its
policy.1°9 One cannot escape the fact that the language of the
statute is a logical corollary to the approach taken concerning
mixed eligibility decisions as formulated by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals because the statute seemingly will hold an HMO liable
for its negligence and the negligence of its employees/agents with
respect to medical decisions, but does not include eligibility
decisions under the plan. Not surprisingly, HMO's in Texas were
ready to mount a challenge to the new statute.
That challenge came soon after the statute went into effect in
Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of
Insurance.110 In CorporateHealth, the plaintiff insurance companies
brought a declaratory judgment action arguing that the liability
provisions, among other provisions in the statute, were preempted
by ERISA.' 1 ' The district court granted Texas's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the liability provisions of the statute,
while denying summary judgment on other challenged provisions.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."'
In a stunning decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld the liability
provisions in the statute. In its analysis, the court concluded that
the liability provisions of the statute were not preempted by ERISA
because the statute only imposes liability "for a limited universe of
events." Those events do not include coverage determinations made
by plan administrators. Next, the court seemed to adopt the
reasoning of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when it drew a
distinction between HMO's acting as plan administrators and HMO's
(2) agents; (3) ostensible agents; or (4) representatives who are acting on its behalf
and over whom it has the right to exercise influence or control or has actually
exercised control which result in the failure to exercise ordinary care.
TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a)Cb) (West 2000).
109. The statute provides in part: the standards in Subsections (a) and (b) create no
obligation on the part of the health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or
other managed care entity to provide to an insured or enrollee treatment which is not
covered by the health care plan of the entity. See id. § 88.002 (d).
110. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex.
1998), rev'd, 215 F3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
111. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 597. The plaintiffs included Corporate Health
Insurance, Inc., Aetna Health Plans of Texas, Inc., Aetna Plans of North Texas, Inc. and
Aetna Life Insurance Company. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction barring the state
insurance commissioner from enforcing the statute. Id.
112. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
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acting as medical service providers." 3 Once the court made this
distinction, it was relatively simple for the court to conclude that
the liability provisions were not preempted by ERISA because the
statute carefully excluded "a duty to provide treatment not covered
by the plan."" 4 Interestingly, the court made only passing reference
to Corcoran in this regard. Finally, the court noted that suits for
malpractice against a doctor are not preempted by ERISA because
the doctor is in a provider network; therefore, an HMO should not
be shielded by ERISA from the liability of its agents." 5 Perhaps the
Texas Health Care Liability Act was the legislative response, albeit
in a different guise, that the Corcoran court was looking for.
CONCLUSION

The Corcoran court concluded that "fundamental changes such
as the widespread institution of utilization review would seem to
warrant a reevaluation of ERISA . . . . [Olur system, of course,
allocates this task to Congress, not the courts."" 6 It is doubtful that
the framers of ERISA intended the statute, designed to provide
comprehensive federal protection to employee pensions, to be used
as a shield from tort immunity by health insurers in medical
malpractice cases resulting in injured people being wholly deprived
of state or federal remedies for their injuries. Therefore, in order to
rectify this error, Congress must develop the courage to amend the
preemption provision of ERISA to permit state law causes of action
against HMO's, or in the alternative, to develop comprehensive
legislation that effectively regulates HMO's. Amending the
preemption provisions of ERISA would provide the least amount of
change to ERISA, and yet produce the equity and uniformity that
the current managed care system is lacking.
However, because congressional action is not likely in the near
future, the most appropriate response to the preemption problem is
for the states to take action similar to that taken by Texas. A state
statute subjecting HMO's to essentially a negligence cause of action
in instances provided for in the Texas legislation, or alternatively
113. Id. at 534. The court noted, citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., that "courts have
observed that HMOs ... typically perform two independent functions-health care insurer
and medical care providers." Id. The court, relying on Dukes, noted that ERISA's broad
preemption clause was not intended by Congress to "supplant" state regulation that is
directed to the quality of medical practice.
114. CorporateHealth, 215 F3d at 534.
115. Id. at 535.
116. Corcoran,965 F2d at 1338-39.
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by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, would effectively correct the
current abuses taking place in those circuits that have adopted a
broad theory of preemption under ERISA.
Todd A. Portzline

